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ABSTRACT
Roll-forward checkpointing schemes [Long et al. 1990; Pradhan and Vaidya
1992] are developed in order to avoid rollback in the presence of independent
faults and increase the possibility that a task completes within a tight deadline.
Despite of the adoption of roll-forward recovery, these schemes are not
necessarily appropriate for time-critical applications because interactions with
the external environment and communications between processes must be
deferred during checkpoint validation steps (typically, two checkpoint intervals)
until the fault-free processors are identified. The deadlines on providing
services may thus be violated. In this paper we present and discuss two
alternative roll-forward recovery schemes, especially for time-critical and
interaction-intensive applications, that deliver correct, timely results even when
checkpoint validation is required.
Key Words — Checkpoint validation, dynamic redundancy, embedded real-
time systems, forward error recovery, timing constraints.
21 Introduction
Embedded real-time systems for critical applications, such as avionics, nuclear power plants,
process control and patient life-support monitoring, often interact with the external environment
under strict dependability and timeliness requirements. Such a system may fail to operate
correctly either due to errors in hardware and software or due to violation of timing constraints
imposed by its environment. Fault tolerance in time-critical systems can thus be considered as
the ability of the system to deliver correct and timely results despite the occurrence of faults
[Jahanian 1994]. However, prevision of fault tolerance and adherence to timing requirements
in these systems may to some extent conflict with each other — actions taken to achieve fault
tolerance may adversely affect the ability of a system to meet its timing constraints. For
example, the traditional Checkpointing and Rollback technique will improve reliability but may
increase the likelihood of missing a deadline. Approaches that address system fault tolerance
without carefully considering real-time aspects are neither practical nor appropriate for time-
critical applications. Advanced techniques must explicitly combine both fault tolerance and
timing requirements.
Roll-forward checkpointing schemes (RFCS) [Long et al. 1990; Pradhan and Vaidya 1992] are
developed to avoid “roll-back” to the previous checkpoints in the presence of faults. Ideally, a
system will return to a normal state after roll-forward recovery and thereby deliver correct and
timely services. This seems to solve the problem of violating real-time constraints. However,
after a careful examination of these RFCS schemes, we determined they are not generally
applicable to time-critical systems since they still have the potential to cause delay in delivering
results. In a RFCS scheme, whenever a fault occurs, two validation steps (usually two
checkpoint intervals) must be taken. Since no processor can be identified as fault-free before
the completion of the validation, neither the delivery of results nor communication with other
processes can be allowed. This is quite questionable — because faults may occur at any point
during the execution of a process. During the two checkpoint intervals for validation, the
3process may need to interact with the external environment or to communicate with the
processes executed on other processors. The delay in response and communication may not be
tolerable in hard real-time systems where a missed deadline can be potentially as disastrous as a
system crash or an incorrect output.
In this paper we examine the issues involved in the use of roll-forward error recovery in
critical, real-time systems, and describe two improved roll-forward recovery schemes that are
capable of ensuring timely services and communications even when faults are detected and
validation steps are required.
2 Duplex Systems, Error Recovery and Timing Constraints
Our major discussion here focuses on duplex systems because they can achieve performance
comparable to TMR using less redundancy and have been widely used in many commercially
available systems. Some commercial systems use the Checkpointing and Rollback Recovery
(CRR) technique to achieve fault tolerance, such as the Tandem Non Stop system [Gray and
Reuter 1993] and the Sequoia multiprocessor [Bernstein 1988]. CRR can decrease the mean
execution time of a task by reducing the time spent in retrying the task [Chandy and
Ramamoorthy 1972]. (When a fault is detected, the task is retried only from the last checkpoint
rather than from the beginning.) The distance of rollback is normally limited to a checkpoint
interval of computation. However, the CRR scheme is not very suitable for time-critical
applications since it has poor predictability of task completion time — as a result of rollback, a
checkpoint interval will be lost once a fault is detected and more intervals may be missed due to
the occurrence of multiple faults. Hence, avoiding rollback is crucial for real-time systems with
high dependability and tight timeliness requirements.
The use of redundant processors can avoid rollback should an independent, hardware-related
fault occur. Two independent processors may be used to duplicate a task and to compare each
checkpoint. A checkpoint mismatch leads to a validation step. During the validation step, the
two processors continue execution while a third spare processor retries the task to determine
which of the diverged processors is fault-free. (It is assumed that the spare processor is shared
4by multiple duplex systems and may not be used to form a TMR system with a duplex system.)
Based on this concept, two similar schemes have been developed. In the look-ahead scheme
[Long et al. 1990; 1991], the processors duplicating the task are themselves duplicated during
the validation step. Five processors are then required for a period of one checkpoint interval. In
the second scheme [Pradhan and Vaidya 1992; 1994a; 1994b], the diverged processors are not
duplicated and just three processors are used for the duration of two checkpoint intervals, as
shown in Figure 1. At the end of the second checkpoint interval, the checkpoint state of the
spare processor is compared with those of processors P1 and P2 where the fault was detected.
The processor P2 will be identified as faulty after this comparison. A recovery action will then
be taken by copying the current state of P1 to the faulty processor P2.
Processor P1
Processor P2
Spare Processor
different checkpointsa fault
Checkpoint Intervals
Copy state from P1 to P2
Fig. 1. Roll-forward checkpointing scheme [Pradhan and Vaidya 1992].
The major advantage of the above two schemes is that they have a lower average execution time
than the CRR scheme, thereby having higher predictability of task completion time. However,
these schemes must retain any results that are to be delivered to the external environment (and
possible communications with other tasks) until completion of the validation steps. This could
be a significant drawback for time-critical applications where the amount of slack available may
be small and the delay of even one or two checkpoint intervals (typically measured in tens
seconds [Long et al. 1991]) may not be acceptable. Moreover, although it has not been stated
explicitly, the advantage of these RFCS schemes holds only under the implicit assumptions that
a task (or a process) does not communicate with the others and it delivers the required services
only at the end of the last checkpoint interval. These schemes may have to roll back when a
5fault occurs during the last two checkpoint intervals [Pradhan and Vaidya 1994a].
Unfortunately, these assumptions are often inappropriate for typical real-time applications.
Tasks or processes in these applications are usually communication- and interaction-intensive.
It is not practical to insert several checkpoint intervals between the interactions of a task with
the external environment. Even just using the time duration between two consecutive
interactions as a checkpoint interval is unacceptable for some applications; the overhead of
execution time can reach hundreds percent in the examples described by [Silva et al. 1994].
Clearly, alternative or improved schemes are needed.
It is important to note that the standard TMR and NMR techniques for forward recovery can
more effectively resolve the issue of missing a deadline (if the time overhead for managing
redundancy can be tolerated). However, the duplex-based schemes have advantage in
efficiency — they require less redundancy (fewer processors on average) than TMR. Our
objective here is to develop alternative schemes that are capable of i) avoiding roll-back, ii)
avoiding delay in interaction with the external environment and in message communication
even when a fault occurs, and iii) achieving the same level of fault tolerance as TMR but using
less average redundancy.
3 System Model and Basic Assumptions
An embedded real-time system can be partitioned into three components: controlled objects (i.e.
sensors and actuators), the computer system, and the operator [Jahanian 1994] (see Figure
2(a)). The controlled objects and the operator constitute the environment of the computer
system. The system interacts frequently with its environment, reacting to stimuli of external
events and producing timely results. Time in such a system is a scarce resource and the
inability of the system to meet the specified timing constraints will be viewed as a failure. In
reality, most real-time computer systems are distributed ones, as shown in Figure 2(b),
consisting of a set of processors interconnected by a real-time communication subsystem. In
order to achieve fault tolerance, some form of redundancy, such as replicated hardware and
recovery mechanisms, must be used to detect and to recover from errors. It is assumed that
these processors are organized as a pool of active processors and a relatively small number of
6passive spare processors (or active processors with some spare processing capacity [Dahbura
et al. 1989]).
Real-Time Computer System
 Controlled
 Objects
Operator
( a )
Redundant Communication Subsystem
Replicated Set 1 Replicated Set 2 Replicated Set 3 Replicated Set 4
Processors
( b )
Fig. 2. (a) An embedded system (b) a distributed real-time computer system.
We assume a system organization for checkpointing and state comparison similar to that used
in [Pradhan and Vaidya 1994b] where further details of the architecture can be found. Each
processor in Figure 1(b) is supposed to contain volatile storage and to be able to access stable
storage. A special processor, called the Checkpoint Processor, is used to compare checkpoints
and perform recovery when the need arises.
A task, or a process, is an independent computation and may be further divided into a group of
related sub-tasks. The execution of a task is partitioned into a series of sequential sub-
computations by checkpoints. The time intervals between checkpoints are denoted as I1, I2, ...,
In. A checkpoint interval is said to be atomic if and only if none of results of the task is visible
to the other tasks and to the external environment during and at the end of that interval; the
interval is said to be interactive otherwise. Conceptually, for any i = 1, 2, ..., n, the checkpoint
interval Ii could be interactive (note that the interval In must be interactive at least). Our major
interest here is in the outputs of a task. However, it is important to note that incoming data and
messages from the external environment or from the other tasks can be used during any
checkpoint intervals but must also be recorded on the stable storage in case they need to be
reused for the purpose of validation.
7Checkpoints can be inserted in a task manually. The interval time may be either roughly equal
or adjustable. Research on the optimal placement of checkpoints has shown that the optimal
checkpoint interval is typically large (in tens seconds) [Long et al. 1991]. For a given task with
a given placement of checkpoints, we assume that atomic and interactive intervals can be
unambiguously identified by examining whether the task needs to output information during
(and at the end of) each checkpoint interval. In order to guarantee correct, timely interaction,
when a task enters an interactive interval, spare redundancy must be exploited even though a
fault may not take place during it. More precisely, a spare processor must be engaged before
the current interactive interval. Thus, a set of particular checkpoint intervals must be further
identified. A checkpoint interval Ii is said to be pre-interactive if and only if the checkpoint
interval Ii+1 is interactive.
To demonstrate the major advantage of our schemes and for purpose of comparison with the
two existing FRCS schemes, we will mainly concentrate on single, independent faults. A fault
may be detected through result comparison before output and through checkpoint comparison
at the end of the checkpoint interval or be detected by the error detection mechanism within the
processor and by an acceptance test at the application level. Some multiple faults in consecutive
checkpoint intervals may defeat any duplex roll-forward strategies (including our proposed
schemes) and thus require roll-back. TMR-type schemes could avoid roll-back for such
multiple faults, but they still have to roll back if multiple faults occur in the same checkpoint
interval. To simplify the description of our schemes, we will first assume that there is a single
fault during any two consecutive intervals and then discuss the ability of our schemes to treat
multiple fault situations. In addition, for related faults, the assumption that two faulty
duplicated processors will always generate distinct checkpoints is not generally applicable; we
will briefly address this issue later.
4 Responsive Roll-Forward Error Recovery
Time-critical applications are essentially responsive — the computer system is required to
interact with its environments frequently, and in a timely manner. We describe in this section
two roll-forward recovery schemes with different error detection mechanisms, which are
8responsive in the sense that correct and timely interactions are ensured even in the presence of
faults.
4 . 1 Roll-Forward Recovery with Dynamic Replication Checks
This Roll-Forward Recovery scheme uses Replication (or comparison) Checks to detect errors.
We call this scheme RFR-RC. The execution of a real-time task in the RFR-RC scheme is
organized and dynamically adjusted with respect to different types of checkpoint intervals.
Atomic Checkpoint Intervals: For any atomic interval, a task is executed on just two
independent processors, say P1 and P2. At every checkpoint, the duplicated task records its
state in the stable storage and the state is also sent to the Checkpoint Processor. At the end of
the checkpoint interval, the Checkpoint Processor compares the two states from the processors
duplicating the task. If the two checkpoint states match, the checkpoint is committed and both
the processors continue executions into the next checkpoint interval. If a mismatch is detected,
a validation step starts. During validation, processors P1 and P2 continue execution while a
spare processor S is engaged to retry the last checkpoint interval using the previously
committed checkpoint. After the spare S completes, its state is compared with the previous
states of P1 and P2. The faulty processor will be identified after this comparison. The state of
the faulty processor can then be made identical to that of the other processor. Both processors
duplicating the task should now be in the correct state. Under our assumption of single
independent faults, a further validation step will not be required (see Figure 3).
Processor P1
Processor P2
Spare Processor S
different checkpointsa fault
Atomic Checkpoint Intervals
Copy state from P1 to P2
Validation Step
Comparison
Comparison
Copy
Fig. 3. Roll-forward recovery during atomic checkpoint intervals.
9Interactive Checkpoint Intervals: For any interactive interval, a spare processor is always
required, in addition to the two processors duplicating the task. During the interactive interval,
any results are voted before being delivered to the external environment, or to the other tasks.
At the end of this interactive interval, the states of the three processors are compared. If a fault
occurs during the interval, it will be detected by the replication check. The state of the faulty
processor will then be replaced using the correct state of the other processors. Whenever the
next checkpoint interval is atomic, the spare processors will be returned to the pool of spares
which are shared by other tasks. Figure 4 illustrates the task execution and roll-forward
recovery during interactive checkpoint intervals.
Processor P1
Processor P2
Spare Processor S
checkpoints
a fault
Interactive Interval
Copy state from P1 to P2
(Atomic Interval)
Return to the pool
VoterVoter
Outcoming Messages
Fig. 4. Task execution and roll-forward recovery during interactive intervals.
Pre-Interactive Checkpoint Intervals: For any pre-interactive interval, in addition to the two
processors duplicating the task, a spare processor may be required unless it has been obtained
in the last interval. There are two cases to consider:
1) A spare processor has not been involved during the last checkpoint interval. In this
case, if the states of two processors P1 and P2 are identical at the end of the last
interval, a spare processor will copy the current state of one of P1 and P2 starting with
the same execution as P1 and P2. However, if the states of P1 and P2 disagree, the
spare will have to use the start state of the last checkpoint interval and retry the
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execution of that interval. The retry and recovery operation is essentially same as the
roll-forward recovery action taken for atomic checkpoint intervals (see Figure 3).
2) A spare processor has been involved during the last checkpoint interval. When the three
processors P1, P2 and S performed the same execution during the last checkpoint
interval, a faulty processor may be detected at the end of that interval. The state of
faulty processor will be replaced by the correct one and the three processors will then
continue the same execution during the pre-interactive interval, as shown in Figure
5(a). If the spare S retried a different execution during the last interval, one of P1 and
P2 will be identified as fault-free at the end of that interval. The state of the fault-free
processor will be copied to the other processors and the three processors will then start
with the same execution (see Figure 5(b)).
Processor P1
Processor P2
Spare Processor S
different checkpointsa fault
Pre-Interactive  Interval
Copy state
from  P2 to S
(Interactive Interval)
( a )
( b )
Processor P1
Processor P2
Spare Processor S
Pre-Interactive  Interval
Copy state from P1 to P2
Comparison
Copy
(Atomic checkpoint intervals)
Copy state from P1 to S
Comparison
Fig. 5. Roll-forward recovery during the pre-interactive checkpoint interval.
Remarks
The RFR-RC scheme supports both roll-forward recovery and timely response. Under a
common assumption (also made for other duplex roll-forward schemes) that multiple faults do
not occur within two consecutive checkpoint intervals, RFR-RC can entirely avoid rollback and
ensure interactions without delay. This is a significant advantage over the existing duplex
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schemes. Depending upon specific applications, our scheme may use more redundancy than
the previously developed duplex RFCS schemes, but it generally requires less redundancy than
the standard TMR technique. For environments where a spare processor is not available, the
following scheme exploits self-checks for error detection, and in many cases is effective in
avoiding roll-back.
4 . 2 Roll-Forward Recovery with Behaviour-Based Checks
In some time-critical environments the amount of redundancy can be an important concern due
to considerations of cost, power, weight and volume etc. The use of spare processors may in
fact be impractical. In order to avoid roll-back and ensure timely response, self-checks must be
employed to identify the faulty processors. These error self-detection methods are behaviour-
based ones, such as illegal instruction detection, memory protection, control-flow monitoring,
watchdog timers and assertions (or acceptance tests [Randell 1975]). Although such fault self-
detection has imperfect error coverage and cannot detect certain types of faults, recent research
and experiments have shown that their coverage can be high enough to enable us to consider
behaviour-based methods as an independent detection mechanism. (A detailed discussion on
behaviour-based methods is given in [Silva et al. 1994].)
Our second scheme, called RFR-BC (Roll-Forward Recovery with Behaviour-based Checks),
uses a process pair approach similar to that used in Tandem [Gray and Reuter 1993], without
having to roll back in the presence of faults. Whenever an active process or task fails, the “hot”
spare task becomes active and delivers the required services. Any messages to the other tasks
or to the external environment are not deferred, but they are checked by acceptance tests before
being sent [Randell and Xu 1994]. The states of two processes at the end of a checkpoint
interval are checked as well and the state passing the test is committed. Checkpointing here is
used for fault detection and fault identification as well as roll-forward error recovery. Once a
faulty processor is located, its state is made identical to the checkpoint state of the fault-free
processor. Therefore, at the beginning of the next checkpoint interval, both processors will be
in the correct state. Figure 6 illustrates how this RFR-BC scheme works.
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Remarks
The idea behind RFR-BC is obvious and has been used in several commercial systems such as
STRATUS (see the related chapter in [Lee and Anderson 1990] and some interesting
discussion in [Laprie et al. 1987]) where each task is actually executed simultaneously by four
CPUs with comparison checks. Comparison-based checks may detect some errors which
escape from the behaviour-based checks. However, RFR-BC uses much less of the system
resources and would be more practical for certain application environments. Of course, result
and checkpoint comparison can be further incorporated into RFR-BC for the purpose of error
detection.
Processor P1
Processor P2
checkpoints
a fault
Checkpoint  Intervals
Copy state from P1 to P2
Outcoming Messages
Pass the test
Fail the test
(pass tests and committed)
Fig. 6. Roll-forward recovery in the RFR-BC scheme.
5 Analysis and Evaluation
In this section we present a brief analysis and compare our schemes with two existing RFCS
schemes [Long et al. 1990; Pradhan and Vaidya 1992], with respect to the level of fault
tolerance, execution time (and its predictability) and processor costs. Some results obtained in
experimental setups are used to support our discussion.
5 . 1 Level of Fault Tolerance
Our discussion mainly focuses on transient faults. Several fault situations are considered.
A. An Independent Fault in Any Two Consecutive Checkpoint Intervals: In this fault situation,
our RFR-RC scheme can avoid any roll-back and ensure timely interactions. If such a fault can
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be caught by its behaviour-based detection mechanism, our RFR-BC scheme has the same
characteristics. However, the previously developed RFCS schemes have to roll back or defer
interactions whenever such a fault occurs during an interactive or pre-interactive checkpoint
interval. Since the deferment is visible to the other tasks and to the outside environment, a
failure of violating the response deadline could be caused.
B. Two Correlated Faults in Two Consecutive Checkpoint Intervals: Due to the use of three
processors, the RFR-RC scheme can avoid roll-back and provide timely response if two
correlated faults occur in non atomic checkpoint intervals; a failure and the deferment of
interactions may take place otherwise. The RFR-BC scheme is quite effective in tolerating such
correlated faults, provided that the faults can be detected by its behaviour-based detection
mechanism. The RFCS schemes will suffer from the same problem as that in the situation A
when the correlated faults appear within an interactive or pre-interactive interval. However,
during atomic checkpoint intervals, in some cases they may tolerate the faults and in other cases
they may not (i.e. require roll-back). (A detailed discussion can be found in [Pradhan and
Vaidya 1994b].)
C. Two Correlated Faults in a Checkpoint Interval: Though such a fault situation may be
detected, they cannot be effectively tolerated by our schemes and the other duplex schemes
because interactions must be deferred. Furthermore, it is possible that two faulty processors
produce the identical incorrect results or the same erroneous checkpoints. This delicate situation
could still be detected by our schemes so as to prevent the erroneous information from having
impact on the other tasks and the outside environment. For example, the RFR-RC scheme may
be designed to demand strict agreement between the three processors replicating the task. This
type of correlated faults may also be detected by self-checks used in the RFR-BC scheme.
However, the previous duplex schemes cannot detect such a fault situation and would thus
deliver (undetected) erroneous services.
Table 1 summarizes the fault tolerance capability of these duplex schemes. In our opinion, the
use of roll-back (for some fault situations) in a roll-forward recovery scheme doesn't seem to
be appropriate. For a given application that tolerates occasional roll-back or loss of checkpoint
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intervals, the standard CRR schemes are more cost-effective and practical [Chandy and
Ramamoorthy 1972]. When such loss of time is not acceptable, roll-back must be avoided
completely using either more redundancy or more complicated self-diagnosis programs. This is
a major reason why we have omitted the discussion on possibilities of using roll-back to treat
some fault situations. We have also omitted the discussion on permanent fault situations which
will generally require the reconfiguration of the hardware system.
Table 1 Fault tolerance capability of various duplex schemes
Schemes
Fault Situations
RFR-RC Scheme RFR-BC Scheme RFCS Schemes
Situation A Avoid roll-back and           
ensure timely response
Avoid roll-back and           
ensure timely response
if faults are self-detected
Defer interactions &
communications and
may require roll-back
Situation B
Avoid roll-back and
ensure timely response
if B occurs during
pre- or interactive
checkpoint intervals;
a failure or deferment
takes place otherwise
Avoid roll-back and           
ensure timely response
if faults are self-detected
Defer interactions &
communications and
may require roll-back
if B occurs during 
pre- or interactive
checkpoint intervals;
Avoid roll-back in
some cases if B 
occurs during certain
atomic intervals
Situation C
Cannot be tolerated
but can be detected
even in some delicate
cases, e.g. two same
erroneous checkpoints 
Cannot be tolerated
but could be self-detected
even in some delicate
cases, e.g. two same
erroneous checkpoints
Cannot be tolerated
but can be detected 
if the erroneous
checkpoints are
different; otherwise
cannot be detected
5 . 2 Execution Time and Its Predictability
In order to investigate the predictability of task execution time, we conduct a small experiment
in a local network environment that consists of a number of Sun 3 workstations. Two
versions, a and b, of a simulation program of controlling a moving object were used in our
experiment, with different interaction frequencies. We only take independent faults into
account. The execution time of the program is partitioned into 30 roughly equal checkpoint
intervals. During the interactive intervals, this simulation program reads control information
from a buffer and updates the outputs that control moves of the object. Atomic checkpoint
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intervals are used to perform pure computations. The version a is programmed to have higher
precision of controlling the moves and require 11 interactive checkpoint intervals, whereas the
version b has only 3 interactive intervals with lower control precision. Independent faults are
injected into both interactive and atomic intervals to examine the effect of possible deferments.
Table 2 gives the information about the task execution with or without the use of roll-forward
recovery schemes.
Table 2 Execution time of the simulation program with or without roll-forward recovery
Program  
version
Normal Execution 
Time in  msec.
Schemes
Checkpointing &
Comparison
Checkpointing &
Self-detection
No. of Intervals/
Interactive Intervals
        
Checkpoint 
Interval
Version a
Version b
840576 330 589 30 / 11
840221 330 589 30 / 3
Execution Time
 in  msec.
850928
858084
Version a
RFR-RC
RFR-BC
RFCS
Extra Execution
Time
Response Delay 
if a fault occurs
Overhead of       
Execution
850479
~ 0
~ 0
~ 28407
Schemes Execution Time
 in  msec.
Version b
RFR-RC
RFR-BC
RFCS
Extra Execution
Time
Overhead of       
Execution
~ 0
~ 0
( a )
( b )
( c )
10352
17508
9903 28353 ~ 56705
1.23 %
2.08 %
1.17 ~ 6.75 %
~ 28419
850225
850326
857719
0 ~ 28369
17498
10004
10105 1.20 %
1.19 ~ 3.38 %
2.08 %
Response Delay if a 
fault occurs
Despite of some practical implications, the data listed above are not used to derive definitive
conclusions. For this special example, the overhead caused by roll-forward recovery schemes
is relatively small. Since the version a requires intensive interactions, the probability that a
given fault occurs within a non atomic interval is very high (more than 0.6). The delay in
interactions, caused by the RFCS scheme when a fault is injected into an interactive interval, is
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about one to two checkpoint intervals. However, such delay may be avoided in the execution
of the version b when an injected fault is detected and recovered within several consecutive
atomic intervals. This experiment shows an important fact that our schemes (both RFR-RC and
RFR-BC) have well predictability of task complete time, being independent of whether a fault
occurs in an atomic checkpoint interval, whereas the execution time (or response time) of the
RFCS scheme varies depending upon the fault distribution (i.e. upon whether they take place
within atomic checkpoint intervals) and upon the interaction frequency of a given application.
5 . 3 Demands for Spare Processors
If the error coverage provided by its behaviour-based self-check mechanism is high enough for
specific applications, the RFR-BC scheme can avoid roll-back without using any spare
processor. The probability that the RFCS scheme requests a spare processor is related to the
probability that a fault is detected. In most likely cases, only two processors (or a duplex
system) are involved.
Our RFR-RC scheme, however, ensures timely response at the price of using more
redundancy as compared with the previous RFCS schemes. In our programming experiment,
the interaction-intensive version a needs a spare processor during 67% of the whole execution
time. This is necessary because the application has high likelihood that a fault occurs within
pre- or interactive checkpoint intervals, thereby deferring normal interactions. If an application
has a relatively low frequency of interactions and communications, the demand for the spare
will be reduced. For example, the version b of the control program decreases the use of the
spare processor down to 20%.
In most practical multiprocessors and distributed systems, the requirement for system
resources varies in a stochastic manner. Spare capacity is an essential demand for such a
system to guarantee its performance when it is most heavily loaded. Clearly, spare capacity can
be used for other purposes, such as fault detection and error recovery. An implementation of
fault diagnosis strategies using the Bell Data Flow Architecture is presented in [Dahbura et al.
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1989], which has shown that using spare capacity (rather than structuring a fixed TMR
subsystem) to support fault detection and diagnosis is practically viable.
6 Conclusions
For most time-critical applications, the execution of a task consists typically of iterations of the
periodic control cycle — read inputs, compute, produce new output. The task can be divided
into several sub-tasks that communicate with each other by message passing. Because of strict
timing constraints on interactions, the delay in updating the output and communicating with the
other tasks may not be acceptable. We have proposed two alternative roll-forward recovery
schemes with different error detection mechanisms. These schemes are shown to be able to
avoid roll-back totally and to guarantee timely response in the presence of independent faults.
It is important to notice that real-time tasks can be non-deterministic and real-time data may be
perishable — if retried they could produce results different from those of the first run since
such executions begin at different absolute times. In our schemes, timely response even in the
occurrence of faults can effectively avoid upsets in the externally visible time behaviour of a
real-time system. The retry of a task on a spare processor is performed only to identify faulty
processors. This process of roll-forward recovery is therefore completely transparent to the
other tasks and the external environment.
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